In the experiments in the report by Marcus et al., infants were familiarized with sequences of syllables that conformed to patterns such as ABB or AAB (for example, "wo fe fe" versus "wo wo fe"). They were then tested on sequences containing different syllables that either matched these patterns or not. Infants preferred (2) novel sequences that violated the pattern to which they had been pre-exposed, and so were said to have learned the rule governing the sequences' "grammar." This conclusion rests on the fact that the test sequences contained novel syllables; thus, the infants could not have learned anything about their statistical properties. However, these "grammatical rules" created other statistical regularities. AAB, for example, indicated that a syllable would be followed by another instance of the same syllable and then a different syllable. Thus, in the pretraining phase, the infant was exposed to a statistical regularity governing sequences of perceptually similar and different events. The report's discussion focused on what the infants could learn about the particular syllables used in training, but there is no reason to deny these infants the capacity to learn these same-different contingencies. 
Response
Eimas suggests an additional control to rule out the possibility that infants could have relied only on the final two syllables. Although we maintain that such a control could bear only on the question of which rules an infant can learn, rather than the question of whether an infants could learn rules (because the generalization of identity itself requires a rule that holds for all instances in a class), we are grateful for the suggestion. We have now run that control, and the results (1) are consistent with our previous findings.
The other two letters state that various modifications of the simple recurrent network can handle our results, but no such network provides a genuine, empirically adequate alternative to our proposal. Seidenberg and Elman present a model that can capture our data, but only by resorting to a technique that Elman has criticized elsewhere (2): the incorporation of an all-knowing "external teacher" that provides the network with information that is not otherwise available in the environment. As we noted in our report, and as Negishi acknowledges in his letter, the standard version of the simple recurrent network--which uses a "predication task" that does not depend on information that is not directly available in the environment--does not succeed in generalizing our ABA or ABB patterns to novel words (3). Seidenberg and Elman appear to abandon (without comment) the usual "predication task" version of the network model in favor of a different kind of model, in which an external teacher decides whether each pair of successive words is identical. Such information is not "directly observable from the environment" (4); instead, it is provided by an external teacher (built by Seidenberg and Elman) that itself builds in an algebraic rule. Because, in the human, that external device must be something inside the child rather than something provided by the environment, Seidenberg and Elman have not gotten rid of the rule; they have simply hidden it (5).
We find Negishi's model to be more interesting. Negishi points out, quite rightly, that an SRN that
